tommure 2 vjɛejaM oinnot:& aH to ghogor¶ alt at insaiso00 minT
[B
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government:]
CHINA RAILWAYS,
CONFIDENTIAL.
[6910]
No. 1.
430
Kee 18 MAR 10,
[February 28.]
SECTION 5.
Sir A. Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.--(Received February 28.)
(No. 98.) Sir,
M. KOKOWTZOFF was good enough to pay me a visit yesterday. The conver-
St. Petersburgh, February 21, 1910. sation soon turned to the question of Manchurian railways, in which his Excellency is chicfly interested. He remarked that he was preoccupied with the activity which the United States Government were displaying in China, and also by the attitude which the Government of the latter country appeared to be inclined to adopt. The question of the Chinchow-Aigun Railway was a most serious one for Russia. A line from Chinchow to Tsitsihar alone would detrimentally affect the revenues of the Eastern Chinese Railway, but its prolongation to Aigun would not only augment the adverse economic conditions, but would, in addition, have a strategical significance of serious import to Russia. The portion from Tsitsihar to Aigun would be a costly undertaking, and could not be remunerative for a long time to come. purely strategic, and as gravely affecting the position of Russia.
He regarded that section as If constructed it would necessitate a very considerable outlay on the part of the Russian Government in strengthening their defences on the Amur. Although he could not deny that China, as an independent sovereign State, had a perfect right to grant railway conces- sions to whom and wherever she wished, still if she allowed a line materially affecting the strategic and commercial interests of Russia to be built in face of the objections of Russia, she could not be surprised if the attitude of the Russian Government towards her were to undergo a marked change. There was, of course, no question of Russia going to war with China, such an eventuality should be excluded from consideration, but the relations between the two countries would not be what they were.
I observed that the American projects appeared to have brought Russia and Japan into closer relations. M. Kokowtzoff said that as regards the larger project, for internationalising the Manchurian Railways, such was the case. The interests and views both of Russia and of Japan in that respect were identical. But in regard to the Aigun line the case was otherwise. The interests of Japan were not affected in the same degree as those of Russia. I asked if he therefore thought that Japan was likely to take a line independent of that of Russia in regard to the Aigun Railway. His Excellency replied that very possibly she might do so, there was no reason against it. I asked whether he had in his mind any alternative proposal to make to the Chinese Government, if, as I understood, he was averse from taking any part in the Aigun line. He said that undoubtedly he had an alternative scheme, which would be of equal, if not greater, advantage to China than the Chinchow line, and which would not meet with objections on the part of Russia. He thought that China might very well, in lieu of the Chinchow concession, grant a definite concession for the line from Kalgan by Urga to Kiakhta, to join on with the Baikal Railway. A commencement had been made with that line, but work had been abandoned. This was a line which would be productive and useful, and Russia might very well take part in it. I enquired whether the Russian Government, as a whole, were in accord with him in respect to that scheme. He replied that M. Isvolsky was entirely in agreement with him on the subject, and that the question would shortly be submitted to the Council of Ministers, where he trusted it would receive favourable consideration.
I did not feel at liberty to give M. Kokowtzoff any indication of the line which the Japanese Government were now following in regard to the Aigun Railway, as I understood that the information which had been supplied to us was of a confidential character. I gathered, however, from the tone and tenour of the observations of M. Kokowtzoff in regard to possible action of Japan that, if not aware of what was actually passing, he was quite prepared that Japan might act independently of Russia. As I do not know whether the trans-Mongolian project of M. Kokowtzoff is possible of realisation, or whether parties interested in the Aigun line would be willing to accept it as a substitute, I did not enter into any discussion with his Excellency on that question.
[2631
ef
I have, &c.
A. NICOLSON.
44
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.